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I. INTRODUCTION 
Great portions of the working Constitution, while not 
described or prescribed by the Document, are urged to be 
merely its “applications”—or merely the “application” of 
its words “as interpreted.” . . .   It becomes inconvenient, 
first, in lumping disparate things together: white-slaving, 
railroad consolidation, Federal Trade Commission, prize-
fight films, radio control, drug traffic, conceivably 
migratory birds, certainly [the National Recovery 
Administration], (and so child labor, and barbers)—all in 
one basket marked “regulate commerce among the 
several States.”1 
[W]e find (once again) that the destruction of migratory 
bird habitat and the attendant decrease in the population 
 
 †  Editor, William Mitchell Law Review; third-year law student, William 
Mitchell College of Law (J.D. expected 2002). 
 1. K.N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15 
(1934). 
1
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of birds “substantially affects” interstate commerce.  The 
effect may not be observable as each isolated pond used 
by the birds for feeding, nesting, and breeding is filled, 
but the aggregate effect is clear, and that is all the 
Commerce Clause requires.2 
 
In the 1930s, prior to the “switch in time that saved nine,”3 
Llewellyn observed the broad powers Congress might take 
according to a liberal interpretation of the Commerce Clause.  His 
prediction proved correct, and today the Commerce Clause is used 
to justify congressional action in areas such as pollution,4 natural 
resources,5 and civil rights.6  Yet many complain that Congress’ 
power has far exceeded that permitted by the Commerce Clause.7  
They point to recent efforts to extend the Commerce Clause to 
domestic abuse or to gun control, issues that appear far removed 
from commercial activity.8  In effect, these authorities suggest, the 
Commerce Clause has been parlayed into an unlimited grant of 
power. 
The most vocal proponents of this view are typically 
originalists—those who claim that the Constitution should be 
interpreted according to the intent of the Framers.9  Originalists 
 
 2. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs., 191 
F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 531 U.S. 159 (2001). 
 3. See generally WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN 214-
20 (1995).  Prior to 1936, the Supreme Court rejected many of the New Deal 
programs proposed by the Roosevelt Administration.  The Court was led by the 
conservative “Four Horsemen,” Justices Willis Van Devanter, James McReynolds, 
George Sutherland, and Pierce Butler.  Their basic legal rationale was that 
Congress’ actions exceeded its enumerated powers under Art. I, § 8 of the 
Constitution.  Id. at 214. 
 4. E.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 
280-81 (1981). 
 5. E.g., Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 281-82 (1977). 
 6. E.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964). 
 7. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Constitutional Faith and the Commerce Clause, 71 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 189-91 (1996) [hereinafter Epstein, Constitutional Faith] 
(suggesting that Commerce Clause jurisprudence retreat to a pre-New Deal 
standard); Russell F. Pannier, Lopez and Federalism, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 71, 78-
82 (1996) (describing Congress’ encroachment upon “general welfare” powers). 
 8. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (Rehnquist, C.J.) 
(domestic violence); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (Rhenquist, 
C.J.) (possession of a gun in a school zone). 
 9. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Judicial Manipulation of the Commerce Clause, 74 TEX. 
L. REV. 695, 695-96 (1996); Epstein, Constitutional Faith, supra note 7, at 182, 188-
89; see also Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 826 (1986).  For a general introduction to the originalist 
2
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claim that the Framers’ concept of commerce was greatly limited.  
Even if the Framers contemplated more than the movement of 
goods between states, they could not have intended commerce to 
include matters of public health and safety that were deferred to 
the states.  Put another way, Congress’ power should be limited to a 
specific, 18th- and 19th-century concept of commerce, the 
interstate economy as the Framers imagined it.10  Thus, Congress’ 
power cannot extend to all of the institutions, and all of the 
complications, presented by the modern industrial or post-
industrial economy.11 
To reach the originalists’ argument, the threshold issue is 
whether the Framers did, in fact, expect the Constitution to be 
interpreted according to their intent.12  If so, the next issue is how 
the Framers intended the Constitution to function.  Did they 
intend the Constitution to provide a set of static, certain set of 
principles?13  Or did they intend a more flexible document that 
would be able to respond to the contingencies the nation would 
face?14 
The answers to these questions are, at best, equivocal.  The 
historical record does not contain any certain answers,15 and that 
record is constantly recast to serve ideological or political goals.16  
These difficulties also reflect a more philosophical issue: whether it 
 
school of constitutional interpretation, see generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE 
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990). 
 10. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585-87 (Thomas, J. concurring). 
 11. See Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 485 
(1981).  Dworkin calls this proposition the “negation argument.”  Id. 
 12. See generally H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original 
Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985). 
 13. See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 11 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 6-7 (1998) [hereinafter Meese, Original Intent]. 
 14. See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of 
Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 799-800 (1983). 
 15. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 1-
3 (1988); Stephen A. Conrad, Some Problems with “Origins”, 16 SO. ILL. U. L.J. 233, 
234-37 (1992); James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the 
Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 38 (1986); Tushnet, supra note 14, at 794-95. 
 16. Compare Hans W. Baade, “Original Intent” in Historical Perspective: Some 
Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1001, 1005-08 (1991), with Raoul Berger, Original 
Intent: The Rage of Hans Baade, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1151, 1156-65 (1993).  Perhaps 
ironically, Baade relied upon 18th-century English common law for the 
proposition that legislative intent was not probative to statutory interpretation.  As 
a result, he interpolated that the founders did not want their intentions to guide 
constitutional interpretation.  Berger’s pointed rebuttal excavated the opinions of 
learned English jurists from the 15th to 17th centuries. 
3
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is even possible for modern legal scholars to put themselves in the 
place of the Framers and supply their motives.17  When the 
Commerce Clause is applied to modern social and economic 
institutions, the tension between the modern mindset and the 
Framers is particularly severe.18 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the tension between 
originalism and the modern application of the Commerce Clause.  
Part II begins with the doctrine of originalism and its relevance as a 
form of constitutional interpretation.19  In Part III, originalism is 
revisited in the context of Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  After 
considering early scholarship,20 it will examine how the Commerce 
Clause has evolved in Supreme Court case law, while comparing 
that evolutionary process against originalist principles.21  In 
particular, three factors are considered.  First, what factors drove 
the development of the Commerce Clause?  Second, are these 
factors indicative of the Commerce Clause’s underlying purpose?  
Third, how does this purpose compare with the intentions of the 
Framers? 
This paper does not purport to offer an authoritative finding 
of the Framers’ intent.  A partial examination of their intent is 
instructive, but it will not be determinative.  Instead, original intent 
is the starting point for a broader understanding of the Commerce 
Clause.  The goal is an interpretive approach that respects the 
clause’s purpose while accommodating the complexity of modern 
society.  In the words of Professor Tribe, 
To the extent that information about the assumptions, 
hopes or fears of those who wrote or ratified a given 
provision might shed light on the provision’s original 
meaning. . . [it seems] worth consulting.  But the ultimate 
question in every case must be what the provision in 
 
 17. E.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: 
Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 435 (1986); Paul Brest, The 
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 221-22 (1980) 
[hereinafter Brest, The Misconceived Quest]; see also FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 121-22 (1889). 
 18. See LEO MARX, THE MACHINE IN THE GARDEN: TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
PASTORAL IDEAL IN AMERICA 148-49 (describing how the Framers did not anticipate 
industrialization or the emergence of technology); Dworkin, supra note 11, at 486 
(noting that modern institutions cannot be interpolated into the imagination of 
the Framers). 
 19. See infra Part II. 
 20. See infra Part III.A. 
 21. See infra Part III.B. 
4
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question means, not what those who favored or opposed it 
thought.22 
II. ORIGINALISM AND THE DETERMINATION OF AN INTERPRETIVE 
PRINCIPLE 
According to originalism, constitutional interpretation should 
follow the intent of the Framers.  But for this approach to be 
consistent, it must also be shown that the Framers intended 
originalism.23  If such intention was present, then the issue becomes 
how originalism can be practiced.24  At minimum, originalism 
requires that the Framers’ intent be inferable from the historical 
record.25  For originalism to function as a legal theory, it should 
provide consistent standards for determining factual cases.26 
A.  Finding the Framers’ Approach to Constitutional Interpretation 
The Framers.  The historical record indicates that the Framers 
considered, at least in retrospect, how the Constitution would be 
interpreted.  James Madison wrote that if “the sense in which the 
Constitution was accepted and ratified by the Nation. . . be not the 
guide in expounding it, there can be no security for a consistent 
 
 22. Lawrence W. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-
Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1242 n. 66 
(1995). 
 23. See Dworkin, supra note 11, at 497 (“Suppose we had made an initial 
decision to look to the intention of the Framers, but found, when we investigated 
their own theories of constitutional intention, that they did not think their own 
intentions should matter at all, under any conception.”) 
 24. See generally Brest, The Misconceived Quest, supra note 17, at 213-16.  Brest 
chose to frame this inquiry somewhat differently, noting some of the practical 
difficulties in determining original intent.  The first difficulty was the 
identification of the Framers, whether representatives at the Convention or the 
members of the state ratifying conventions.  Id. at 214.  Other difficulties were 
what such a varied group might have intended, and the specificity with which they 
sought their intent to be applied.  Id. at 215-16. 
 25. See id. at 213-14. 
 26. See Tushnet, supra note 14, at 784 (noting that constitutional theory 
developed in part as a means to constrain judges to standards); see also Brennan, 
supra note 17, at 435 (“It is arrogant to pretend from our vantage we can guage 
accurately the intent of the Framers on application of principle to specific, 
contemporary questions.”); infra Part II.C.  “Consistency” is not offered as an 
inherent requirement of the law, nor is it meant to suggest that law should be 
applied in an exact, scientific manner.  Rather, this concept is meant in its 
pragmatic sense—that the application of law should be reasonably predictable. 
5
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and stable, more than for a faithful exercise of its powers.”27  But 
Madison’s writings also point to the contrary.  “[I]t must be allowed 
by all that the best key for the text of the Constitution, as of a law, is 
to be found in the contemporary state of things and the maladies 
and defects which were to be provided for.”28 
Madison’s words are further complicated by his refusal to 
publish his notes of the Constitutional Convention.29  His rationale 
was that the debates of the Convention lacked any “authoritative 
character.”30  As a result, the most complete record of the 
Convention was not published until after his death, in 1840.31  In 
the meantime, the only records of the Convention were those of 
Luther Martin and Robert Yates; both provided accounts that were 
highly abridged and highly subjective.32 
 
 27. Letter from James Madison to Henry Lee (June 25, 1824), in 9 JAMES 
MADISON, WRITINGS at 191 (Gaillard Hunt ed.) (1910) [hereinafter MADISON, 
WRITINGS]. 
 28. Letter from James Madison to William Cabell Rives (Dec. 20, 1828), in 3 
JAMES MADISON, LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS 663-64 (1865).  Perhaps with the 
“contemporary state” in mind, Madison suggested that when the constitutionality 
of government actions was at issue, both the judiciary and the popular will of the 
electorate would constrain the government.  See Donald O. Dewey, James Madison 
Helps Clio Interpret the Constitution, 15 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 38, 48-49 (citing Letter 
from James Madison to M.L. Hurlbert (May 1830), in 9 MADISON, WRITINGS, supra 
note 27, at 370-75).  But cf. Paul D. Carrington, Meaning and Professionalism in 
American Law, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 297, 298-99 (1993).  Carrington finds that 
Madison intended “mere[ ] acceptance of the words embodied in the charter 
itself. . . to be understood by those who ratified it.”  Id. (quoting 3 JAMES MADISON, 
LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS, supra, at 228). 
 29. Dewey, supra note 28, at 45-46. 
 30. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Ritchie (Sept. 15, 1821), in 9 
MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 27, at 71-72.  Dewey also notes, “[Madison’s] view 
of the relative unimportance of the Federal Convention of 1787 is surprising.  He 
consistently described the proceedings of this Convention as less significant than 
those of the ratifying conventions for anyone seeking the meaning of the 
Constitution.”  Dewey, supra note 28, at 42. 
 31. Dewey, supra note 28, at 45-46.  Baade’s analysis, first mentioned supra 
note 16, suggests that originalism dates from this publication.  He partly relies 
upon the analysis of Lysander Spooner; in 1848, he was one of the first legal 
scholars to examine Madison’s records.  Spooner concluded that the record was 
fragmentary and unreliable.  Baade, supra note 16, at 1046-48. 
 32. Dewey, supra note 28, at 45-46.  Dewey suggests that Madison delayed 
publication just so he could have the last word against Martin and Yates.  Id.  On a 
related point, a comparative analysis of all three accounts led one modern 
commentator to believe that none were reliable.  See generally Hutson, supra note 
15, at 38 (including excerpts directly photographed and reproduced from the 
original documents).  Another commentator has noted, “If it were true that the 
ratifiers wanted their intent to control . . . they can be justly accused of gross 
negligence for failing to take even rudimentary steps to preserve their precious 
6
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Even if Madison espoused some form of originalism, little 
evidence appears to corroborate his point of view.  Alexander 
Hamilton rejected any notion that extrinsic evidence might be used 
to construe the Constitution.  Instead, he suggested that language 
be applied in its obvious and popular sense.33  Thomas Jefferson 
had a similar philosophy. 
Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious 
reverence, and deem them too sacred to be touched.  
They ascribe to the men of the preceding age a wisdom 
more human . . . .  Let us not weakly believe that our 
generation is not as capable as another of taking care of 
itself . . . .34 
To summarize, given a terse review of the Founding Fathers, none 
express any clear principle for constitutional interpretation.35 
Other historical sources: an introduction.  Another approach is to 
examine early constitutional interpretation.  The Framers’ 
contemporaries were the first to be confronted by interpretive 
issues.  Their direct relationship with the Framers suggests that they 
would have been best informed of, or closest to, the Framers’ 
interpretive approach.  However, this inquiry must appreciate the 
risk of projecting modern doctrine onto their efforts, which may or 
may not have consciously embraced an ideology of constitutional 
law. 
Other historical sources: The First Congress.  One early source 
offers some indication of originalism.  In what may have been the 
first issue of constitutional impression, the First Congress debated 
the meaning of the Treaty Clause.36  Their deliberations reveal a 
desire to discover the intent of the Framers.37  However, when the 
Framers in that Congress were asked what was intended, the 
 
thoughts.”  Boris I. Bittker, Interpreting the Constitution: Is the Intent of the Framers 
Controlling?  If Not, What Is?  19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 9, 33 (1995). 
 33. Powell, supra note 12, at 915 (citing Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the 
Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank, in 8 PAPERS, at 111 (Harold C. Syrett 
ed. 1965)). 
 34. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in 
THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 558-59 (1975). 
 35. Lest the reader be misled, Jefferson was not a signatory to the 
Constitution.  However, his participation in the development of constitutional law 
is probative.  For example, many of the structures in the U.S. Constitution can be 
drawn from Jefferson’s influence on the Virginia Constitution.  See WILLARD 
STERNE RANDALL, THOMAS JEFFERSON: A LIFE 353-55 (1993). 
 36. 5 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 775 (1796); see generally Baade, supra note 16, at 
1014-21. 
 37. 5 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 775 (1796). 
7
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Framers balked.38  The record noted, 
But after all, whatever veneration might be entertained 
for the body of men who formed our Constitution, the 
sense of that body could never be regarded as the oracular 
guide in expounding the Constitution.  As the instrument 
came from them it was nothing more than the draft of a 
plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity were 
breathed into it by the voice of the people, speaking 
through the several State Conventions.39 
Other historical sources: Early Supreme Court decisions.  The early 
decisions of the Supreme Court offer another source for early 
constitutional interpretation.  For example, in Hylton v. United 
States,40 the Court considered whether a tax on carriages violated 
the proscription against “direct” taxes in Article I, section 9.41  In 
the lead opinion, Justice Chase acknowledged the intent of the 
Framers.42  However, his analysis began with a straightforward 
textual analysis, deriving Congress’ power of indirect taxation by 
comparing sections 8 and 9 of Article I.43  He bolstered this 
argument with a pragmatic example, noting the fundamental 
difference between taxing per person instead of per commodity.44  
The supporting opinions take a similar, practical approach that 
consider the purpose and effect of the law.45 
 
 38. Id.  (“He should have remarked, that neither himself nor the other 
members who had belonged to the Federal Convention, could be under any 
particular obligation to rise in answer to a few gentlemen, with information, not 
merely of their own ideas at that period, but of the intention of the whole 
body . . . .. “) 
 39. Id. at 776.  This text also supports the proposition, advanced by some, that 
the “original intent” was originally understood to refer to the intent of the state 
ratifying conventions.  See Bittker, supra note 32, at 31.  It is also instructive to 
reevaluate some of Madison’s statements according to this theory.  See Dewey, 
supra note 28, at 40; see also supra notes 27-28, 30 and accompanying text. 
 40. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796). 
 41. Id. at 172-73.  “No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in 
Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.”  
U.S. CONST. art. I § 9 cl. 4. 
 42. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 173 (“If the framers of the Constitution did not 
contemplate other taxes than direct taxes, and duties, imposts, and excises, there 
is great inaccuracy in their language.”). 
 43. Id. at 174. 
 44. Id.  In his example, Justice Chase posits an example where a per-
commodity tax is apportioned to all the citizens of a state.  In states of equal 
population, a state with more carriages has a higher per capita tax burden than a 
state with fewer carriages.  Justice Chase dryly observes the “very great inequality 
and injustice” of such a scheme.  Id. 
 45. Justice Paterson reaches the same textual implications as Justice Chase.  
8
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These interpretive principles are further demonstrated by 
Chief Justice Marshall’s decision in McCulloch v. Maryland.46  Briefly 
put, the issues were whether the Congress had power to 
incorporate a bank, and if so, whether Maryland had power to tax 
it.47  Again, the Court relied upon textual analysis.  To define what 
is “necessary,” it compared that term’s use in the Necessary and 
Proper Clause with its use in Article I, section 10.48  But the Court’s 
textual analysis broadened to include an architectural point, noting 
that the Necessary and Proper Clause is included among Congress’ 
section 8 powers rather than its section 9 proscriptions.49  The 
Court even draws from extrinsic sources.  Where limiting language 
was omitted from the Constitution, and that language appeared in 
the Articles of Confederation, the Court noted that Article I powers 
may be implied.50 
McCulloch also resorts to the pragmatic reasoning previously 
observed in Hylton.51  Just as Justice Chase noted the impracticality 
of apportioning commodity taxes to nonowners of the commodity, 
Chief Justice Marshall noted the impracticality of apportioning 
 
Id. at 176.  But he then moves to more practical considerations, including the 
need to distinguish land from goods, and the need for the federal government to 
collect revenue.  Put another way, Paterson appears to consider the purposes and 
needs that the tax power was designed to serve.  See id. at 178-80.  He even relies 
upon an extrinsic, nonlegal source to support his argument.  Id. at 180-81 
(quoting 3 ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 331, 341 (1775) (*383, *386 (3d ed. 
1784))).  (The starred page numbers are employed for the third edition of Wealth 
of Nations; for futher discussion of Smith’s work, see supra notes 109-15 and 
accompanying text.)  Justice Iredell’s arguments are a similar blend of textual 
interpretation and practical reasoning.  Id. at 181-83. 
 46. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).  The reader will be pleased to learn that, 
despite the use of this chestnut, there will be no exclamation as to what document, 
if any, is being “expounded.” 
 47. Id. at 401, 425. 
 48. Id. at 413.  “[The Congress shall have Power] To make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, 
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
States. . . . “  U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 cl. 18.  “No State shall, without the Consent of 
Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be 
absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws. . . . “  U.S. CONST. art. I § 10 
cl. 2. 
 49. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 419. 
 50. Id. at 406 (noting that the Tenth Amendment refers to powers “not 
delegated,” whereas the Articles referred to powers “not expressly delegated”). 
 51. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 752-
754 (1999) (offering an in-depth analysis of the interpretive techniques employed 
in McCulloch, and particularly noting Justice Marshall’s pragmatism). 
9
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state taxes to nonresidents of the state.52  And the Court’s reasoning 
takes an even broader step, making several inferences about the 
powers of Congress from the purpose and structure of the 
Constitution.  For example, after looking at the Supremacy Clause53 
and the states’ ratification processes,54 Marshall infers that the 
federal government acquired some sovereign power over the 
states.55  He notes that many of the enumerated powers, including 
collection of taxes, borrowing of money, and support of the 
military, are facilitated by a national bank.56  But the broadest 
inference is that Congress’ powers must be construed in a manner 
that is adapted to “the crises of human affairs,” even where such 
powers are not explicitly supplied by the Constitution.57 
This brief analysis of McCulloch is not offered to prove the 
correctness of the Chief Justice’s views.  Rather, it shows the broad 
sweep of interpretive techniques used by a contemporary of the 
Framers.58  And more tellingly, neither Hylton nor McCulloch 
 
 52. Compare Hylton, 3 U.S. at 174, with McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 428. 
 53. U.S. CONST. art. VI cl. 3. 
 54. Compare prior discussion of the ratifiers’ intent, supra notes 27-28, 30, 39. 
 55. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 404-06. 
 56. Id. at 407. 
 57. Id. at 415.  To quote the passage at length, 
The subject is the execution of those great powers on which the welfare 
of a nation essentially depends.  It must have been the intention of those 
who gave these powers, to insure, so far as human prudence could insure, 
their beneficial execution.  This could not be done, by confiding the 
choice of means to such narrow limits as not to leave it in the power of 
congress to adopt any which might be appropriate, and which were 
conducive to the end.  This provision is made in a constitution, intended 
to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the 
various crises of human affairs. To have prescribed the means by which 
government should, in all future time, execute its powers, would have 
been to change, entirely, the character of the instrument, and give it the 
properties of a legal code. It would have been an unwise attempt to 
provide, by immutable rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must 
have been seen dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur. 
Id. Like Justice Chase, there is a rhetorical nod to the “intention of those who gave 
these powers.”  Id.  It is interesting to note how modern commentators have 
molded this passage to support various schools of constitutional thought.  Compare 
Edwin Meese III, Construing the Constitution, 19 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 22, 25 (1985) 
(finding that Chief Justice Marshall was “keeping faith” with originalist principles, 
and was referring to the adaptability of the enumerated powers), with Amar, supra 
note 51, at 752-53 (finding that Justice Marshall sought liberal, nontextual reading 
of Congress’ powers in order to facilitate the pragmatic purposes of the federal 
government). 
 58. Although he was not a signatory, Chief Justice Marshall appeared in 
arguments before the Convention.  WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, THE CONSTIUTION AND 
10
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directly pose the originalist question.  That is, did the Framers 
intend an indirect commodity tax?  Or did the Framers intend a 
federal bank,59 one that would be exempt from taxation?  Instead, 
the opinions are a balance of historical, textual, and pragmatic 
concerns.  In McCulloch, Justice Marshall even appears to reject 
reliance upon the Framers. 
In the course of the argument [before the Court], the 
Federalist has been quoted; and the opinions expressed 
by the authors of that work have been justly supposed to 
be entitled to great respect in expounding the 
constitution.  No tribute can be paid to them which 
exceeds their merit; but in applying their opinions to the 
cases which may arise in the progress of our government, 
a right to judge of their correctness must be retained; and 
to understand the argument, we must examine the 
proposition it maintains, and the objections against which 
it is directed.60 
Summation.  This brief review of the historical record cannot 
conclusively show that the Framers did not intend originalism.  
However, there is significant evidence that the Framers did not 
have a unified approach to constitutional interpretation.  Nor were 
the Supreme Court’s early decisions made according to any 
recognizable originalist principles.61  If the Framers intended 
originalism, it is puzzling that their intention was not commonly 
recognized or carried out by their contemporaries. 
B.  The Integrity of the Historical Record 
Originalism relies upon history.  The Framers’ intentions, 
though primarily derived from the Constitution itself, are also 
determined from the records, writings, and debates of the 
 
CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL 3-4 (1978). 
 59. From the time a federal bank was first proposed, its constitutionality was a 
point of major contention, suggesting that the Framers’ intent was far from 
unitary on the issue.  See JOSEPH M. LYNCH, NEGOTIATING THE CONSTUTION: THE 
EARLIEST DEBATES OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 109-12 (1999). 
 60. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 433. 
 61. See also Jacobus TenBroek, Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic 
Aids in Constitutional Construction, 26 CAL. L. REV. 437, 445 (1938).  In a broad 
survey, TenBroek examined whether the Court’s decisions were concerned with 
the Framers’ intent.  He noted several cases where historical sources were used to 
support the Court’s position, but he concluded that such usage was not pervasive 
enough to be deemed a fundamental interpretive principle.  Id. at 445-49. 
11
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Framers.62  Absent a sufficient historical basis, constitutional 
interpreters can only speculate as to what the Framers intended.63 
The primary historical records are those of the Convention of 
1789.  As previously noted, only three records were made of the 
proceedings, by Luther Martin, Robert Yates, and James Madison.64  
Of those three, Madison’s is the most complete, and it is generally 
the favored record of constitutional scholars.65  However, there are 
several reservations as to the reliability of any of the records of the 
convention; they are far from complete and reflect the implicit or 
explicit biases of the authors.66 
If intent is to be derived from sources beyond those of the 
Convention itself, further difficulties arise.  Some look to the 
ratifying State Conventions.  There is significant evidence that the 
intent of the “Ratifiers,” not the Framers, was meant to inform 
constitutional interpretation.67  Yet the records of the State 
Conventions are far from complete.  Elliot’s Debates, the sole 
record of the Conventions,68 only offers deliberations from nine of 
the states.69  In addition, because of fragmentary accounts from 
three of the smaller states,70 the Ratifiers’ record is confined to the 
interests of the larger states.  Given the lack of uniformity in the 
record, it is difficult, if not dangerous, to extrapolate the intent of 
the Ratifiers. 
 
 62. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 368 (1977); BORK, supra note 9, at 165. 
 63. See LEVY, supra note 15, at 285; Brest, The Misconceived Quest, supra note 17, 
at 213; Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 523, 523, 553 (1995); Powell, supra note 12, at 919-20; TenBroek, 
supra note 61, at 437 n. 3. 
 64. Dewey, supra note 28, at 45; see also supra notes 30-32 and accompanying 
text. 
 65. See Bittker, supra note 32, at 32; Hutson, supra note 15, at 24-25. 
 66. Dewey, supra note 28, at 45-46; Hutson, supra note 15, at 24-33.  See also 2 
WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES 1009, 1012 (1953) (suggesting that Madison may have 
misrepresented parts of the proceedings to suit his own political views); Letter 
from James Madison to N.P. Trist (Dec. 1831), in 9 MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 
27, at 473 (“Of the Debates [of the Convention], it is certain that they abound in 
errors, some of them very material in relation to myself.  Of the passages quoted, it 
may be remarked that they do not warrant the inference drawn from them.”). 
 67. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 12, at 931; see also supra note 40. 
 68. Hutson, supra note 15, at 13. 
 69. See 2 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES OF THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON 
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION v-xi (2d ed. 1836) (Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland); 3 id. at v 
(Virginia); 4 id. at iv-ix (North Carolina, South Carolina). 
 70. 2 id. at 185, 205, 547. 
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Other extrinsic sources offer similar pitfalls.  Early records of 
Congress have been questioned on the basis of their accuracy.71  
Significant value has been attached to the Federalist Papers, but the 
Papers were partisan documents developed in the context of New 
York’s highly charged ratification proceedings.72  More remote 
historical sources are subject to criticism as well: some criticize the 
lack of development in historical record,73 whereas others point to 
the lack of hierarchy by which the relevance of sources can be 
evaluated.74 
C.  Deriving a Consistent Standard for Constitutional Adjudication 
The difficulties posed by the historical record lead to a third 
issue.  Part of the appeal of originalism is that it provides an 
abstract, neutral basis from which to determine the law.75  Instead 
of permitting judges to manipulate interpretive principles to arrive 
at a subjectively desirable result, originalism constrains judges to a 
fixed standard.76  Therefore, the doctrine ensures a consistent 
 
 71. See NATIONAL HISTORICAL PUBLICATIONS COMMISSION, A NATIONAL 
PROGRAM FOR THE PUBLICATION OF HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 93-94 (1954) (noting 
that many of the early records were derived from contemporary newspapers); 
Hutson, supra note 15, at 36-37.  In particular, Hutson finds that the reporter, 
Thomas Lloyd, was known for excessive drinking.  Lloyd’s shorthand was cluttered 
and surrounded by doodling.  His transcriptions not only failed to match his 
shorthand but also were attacked for misrepresenting the substance of 
proceedings.  Hutson, supra note 15, at 36-38. 
 72. Bittker, supra note 32, at 33; Flaherty, supra note 63, at 553 & n. 137 
(noting a “fetish” of reliance upon one or two historical sources, especially the 
Federalist Papers). 
 73. See, e.g., Stephen A. Conrad, Some Problems with “Origins,” 16 SO. ILL. U. L.J. 
233, 234-37 (1992) (noting the lack of historical antecedents for colonial law). 
 74. See David M. Beatty, The Forms and Limits of Constitutional Interpretation, 49 
AM. J. COMP. L. 79, 99 (2001); Powell, supra note 12, at 43.  See also Robert Post, 
Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, in LAW AND THE ORDER OF CULTURE 13, 22-23 
(1991).  Post identifies some of the modern presumptions underlying originalist 
analysis.  In particular, he notes how historical analysis can be undermined by the 
persuasive process. 
The Federalist Papers are by common convention presumed to constitute 
authoritative (and convenient) evidence of the intent of the Framers, 
although any historian could easily demonstrate the empirical 
inadequacy of the presumption . . . .  [H]istorical interpretation need not 
focus on the intentions of the Framers or Ratifiers at all, but may attempt 
instead to ascertain consent through inquiries aimed at altogether 
different kinds of evidence. 
 75. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 94 (1980); Dworkin, supra 
note 11, at 469-70; Tushnet, supra note 27, at 784. 
 76. Lillian R. BeVier, The Integrity and Impersonality of Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L. 
13
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result.  To put this point more broadly, if all people enjoy the 
consistent, predictable application of the law, then the basic 
aspirations of the law—fairness and equality—are served.77  The 
issue here is whether originalism indeed offers a neutral basis for 
the fair application of the law. 
In the context of the prior discussion of history and 
originalism, the basic inquiry was whether historical concepts can 
be interpreted neutrally.78  The interpreter must first decide which 
facts best illuminate a historical concept.79  This decision already 
poses a value judgment, as different levels of significance are 
accorded to different facts.80  Some observers feel that this decision 
is inherently political.81  In the highly charged, value-sensitive field 
of constitutional adjudication, it is practical to observe that any 
doctrine, no matter how dispassionately executed, is subject to the 
pressures of realpolitick.82 
 
& PUB. POL’Y 283, 284 (1996) (describing originalism as “axiomatic”); Meese, 
Original Intent, supra note 13, at 11 (finding that originalism is “an enduring 
standard”; decrying the “extra-constitutional tradition in which doctrine and 
meaning have no fixed source and hence can easily be changed over time by 
judicial fiat”); Henry P. Monoghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 
360 (1953) (“All of these [nonoriginalist doctrines] view the constitution as 
positively forbidding ‘wrongs’— distribution of burdens and benefits by the 
political process that offend some current conception of political morality.”)  But see 
Tribe, supra note 22, at 1224-25 (“[O]nly on rare occasions do I find . . . that the 
law of the Constitution is, in the end, merely a language for pressing one’s 
preferences.”) 
 77. Bork’s approach explores the philosophical basis of this proposition.  He 
frames the problem as the “Madisonian dilemma”: If the majority determines the 
principles by which the minority is governed, then the majority is free to impose its 
tyranny.  Because “dominant” doctrines of constitutional interpretation do not 
place sufficient limits on judicial power, the rights of the minority are jeopardized.  
See BORK, supra note 9, at 140-41. 
 78. See supra note 74. 
 79. See Flaherty, supra note 63, at 553; Post, supra note 74, at 22-23.  But cf. 
Monaghan, supra note 76, at 374-77 (finding that, because some extrinsic sources 
of the Framers’ intent are available, the Framers’ intent is sufficiently 
determinable). 
 80. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text. 
 81. See Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential 
Contradiction of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1090-92; 
Flaherty, supra note 63, at 553; see also Tushnet, supra note 14, at 795-96 (“And to 
the extent that the supplementary [rules of constitutional interpretation] are 
based on policy grounds, the liberal project itself is defeated. . . confront[ing] 
liberalism with the anomaly of relying on a particular political or social vision to 
support interpretivism.”). 
 82. See ELY, supra note 75, at 55 (observing that “[n]eutral principles have 
often served as a code term for judicial conservatism”); Flaherty, supra note 63, at 
551-52 (noting that originalism should be viewed as a rhetorical construct, whose 
14
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In addition, historical interpretation has its limits.  In the case 
of originalism, the historical inquiry determines not only the intent 
of those long past, but also prospectively applies that intent to 
modern issues.  Even proponents of originalism recognize that 
certain modern concepts cannot be reconciled with the intent of 
the Framers.83  At this point, at this threshold of modernity, the 
interpretive principles of originalism are in crisis.  The principled 
interpreter must abandon a particularized, neutral standard and 
decide whether and how to apply the intentions of the past.84 
One way of resolving the issue is to exclude modern concepts 
from the Constitution.  Put another way, if the Framers did not 
consider an idea, then they could not have intended the 
Constitution to incorporate that idea.85  Another possible solution 
is to extrapolate how the Framers would address a modern 
concept.86  This approach requires that the interpreter either 
 
use is determined by its persuasive effect in litigation); Jonathan R. Macey, 
Originalism as an “Ism,” 19 HARV.  J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 301, 305 (1996) (“[O]nce 
judicial review becomes a feature of a legal system. . . there is a danger that the 
constitutional text will be transformed to coincide with the political interests of 
whoever is interpreting the document.”); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Precedent, the 
Amendment Process, and Evolution in Constitutional Doctrines, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 67, 72 (1988) (finding that the advocacy of interpretive doctrines is a 
participatory process that democractically expresses the ideas of the community). 
 83. E.g., Bork, supra note 9, at 826.  He says, 
[Originalism] is not the notion that judges may apply a constitutional 
provision only to circumstances specifically contemplated by the Framers.  
In such a narrow form the philosophy is useless.  Because we cannot 
know how the Framers would vote on specific cases today, in a very 
different world from the one they knew, no intentionalist of any 
sophistication employs the narrow version just described. 
Id. 
 84. The subsequent discussion offers three possible interpretive approaches.  
See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.  This conclusion has some 
similarities to the thesis in Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist Case for Brown v. 
Board of Education, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457, 457 (1996).  To paraphrase 
McConnell’s argument, the originalists had to either (1) find that desegregation 
was not intended by the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, (2) concede that 
the Framers wanted a result that had become morally unacceptable by modern 
standards, or (3) derive some argument by which desegregation would accord with 
the intent of the Framers.  Id. 
 85. See, e.g., Norman Dorsen, How American Judges Interpret the Bill of Rights, 11 
CONST. COMMENT.’ 379, 385 (1994); Dworkin, supra note 11, at 485; Tribe, supra 
note 22, at 1241. 
 86. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Some Thoughts on Constitutional Indeterminacy, 
19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 363, 368 (finding that the Commerce Clause had been 
interpreted to “create a federal power that, if candidly acknowledged at the 
Framing, would have scuttled the new constitution of 1787 even before the 
ratification debates began”). 
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import the concept into the Framers’ world, or find an appropriate 
analogy, and then decide what the Framers would have thought.87  
But this sort of thought exercise invites the sort of speculation that 
originalism was meant to avoid.88 
To avoid the negation required from the first approach and 
the speculation offered by the second approach, a middle way has 
emerged.  Here, when the threshold of modernity is reached, the 
inquiry moves from the intent to the purpose of the Framers.89  
Unlike the speculative approach, this inquiry is confined to a 
rigorous, historical determination of the Framers’ purpose.90  
Thereafter, if decisions are made beyond the threshold of 
modernity, the decision must respect the underlying purposes of 
the Framers. 
But a determination of purpose runs contrary to fundamental 
precepts of originalism.  Purpose suggests more than simple an 
expression of simple intent.  It is an appeal to the extrinsic 
motivations of the Framers, with a look to the ends the Framers 
desired to achieve, rather than the means the Framers intended to 
provide.91  Thus, the middle way begins to resemble other 
interpretive doctrines: it limits the value of the constitutional text, 
and it is less likely to provide a fixed, abstract basis for adjudication. 
Thus, at least in theory, originalism has several limitations.  But 
to explore the practical scope of these limitations, it is necessary to 
observe the historical passage through the threshold of modernity.  
Perhaps the most compelling illustration of this passage is the 
transformation of the Framers’ nation from an agrarian society to a 
post-industrial information economy.  In turn, the primary 
 
 87. See Randy E. Barnett, The Relevance of the Framers’ Intent, 19 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 403, 405 (1996); Bittker, supra note 32, at 35; Dworkin, supra note 11, at 
486. 
 88. Brest suggests that this approach invites solipsism into the interpretive 
process.  See Brest, The Misconceived Quest, supra note 17, at 221-22; see also supra 
notes 75-77 and accompanying text. 
 89. See Bork, supra note 9, at 826 (saying that where intent does not readily 
supply a result, the interpreter must seek a “major premise” that states a “core 
value that the Framers intended to protect”). 
 90. Bork also suggests that where a constitutional issue has controverted 
moral dimensions, the issue falls beyond the scope of constitutional jurisprudence.  
Thus, Bork presents a de facto rejection of any substantive constitutional rights 
that have “moral” implications.  See BORK, supra note 9, at 255-56; see also Bittker, 
supra note 32, at 35 (rejecting Bork); Monaghan, supra note 76, at 363, 390-91 
(offering a similar philosophy to Bork’s). 
 91. But see Dworkin, supra note 11, at 472-73 (finding that originalism 
overlooks the purpose and architecture of the Constitution). 
16
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constitutional provision implicated by this transformation is the 
Commerce Clause.  In sum, moving from interpretive theory to 
actual practice, the evolution of the Commerce Clause offers the 
opportunity to evaluate the principles and limits of originalism.92 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
A.  The Framers’ Concept of Commerce 
In his concurrence in United States v. Lopez, Justice Thomas 
considered the definition of commerce under the Commerce 
Clause.93  One of his considerations was intratextual, comparing the 
power to regulate commerce to the other enumerated powers.94  
He noted that many of the other enumerated powers—enactment 
of bankruptcy laws, issuance of currency, and establishment of 
weights and measures—substantially affect commerce.95  If 
commerce included matters that substantially affected it, he 
reasoned, then many of the enumerated powers would be rendered 
superfluous.96 
Justice Thomas also considered the Framers’ understanding of 
the plain meaning of commerce.97  Relying upon several 
contemporary dictionaries, he found that commerce consisted of 
“selling, buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for those 
purposes.”98  From the term’s usage in the Federalist Papers, Elliot’s 
Debates, and contemporary newspapers, he further concluded that 
commerce was a concept separate from agriculture or 
manufacturing.99 
Justice Thomas’ definition of commerce provides a useful 
 
 92. See FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 63 (1937). 
The history of American constitutional law in no small measure is the 
history of the impact of the modern corporation upon the American 
scene.  We are still sadly wanting a comprehensive account of the 
pervasive influence of corporate enterprise upon our national life, and its 
judicial aspect is only very partially written in the opinions dealing with 
constitutional limitations claimed for incorporated business. 
Id. 
 93. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-93 (1995). 
 94. Id. at 588. 
 95. Id. at 588-89. 
 96. Id. at 589. 
 97. Id. at 585-93. 
 98. Id. at 585-86 (citing three eighteenth-century dictionaries). 
 99. Id. at 590-92. 
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starting point for an investigation into the Framers’ understanding 
of commerce.  As this investigation proceeds, it will be instructive to 
compare his definition against other elements of the historical 
record.  The purpose of this investigation is not to push the 
Framers’ concept beyond its boundaries, but to observe the 
semantic limitations upon commerce’s meaning. 
Historically, the primary purpose of the Commerce Clause was 
to facilitate trade, between the states and abroad.100  Toward that 
end, Tench Coxe, a Philadelphia merchant, appeared before the 
Convention in May of 1787.101  Coxe argued for a “stronger, more 
centralized government.”102  In particular, he focused on his 
manufacturing concerns, complaining of “the high rate of 
labour. . . the want of a sufficient number of hands . . . the scarcity 
and dearness of raw materials—want of skill in the business itself 
and its unfavorable effects on the health of the people.”103  These 
issues—the distribution of resources and the availability of labor—
implicated more than the ordinary movement and sale of 
commodities.  Rather, Coxe had identified some of the primary 
difficulties confronting industrialization.104 
It is unlikely that the Framers recognized the significance of 
Coxe’s complaints.105  The Framers did not understand the 
importance of industrialization, nor did they realize how factory-
based manufacturing would alter the economy.106  At that time, the 
concept of manufacturing itself focused upon the skilled crafting of 
a product, not unskilled mass production.107  Long-standing 
concepts, such as “engine,” “machine,” and “industry,” were being 
 
 100. See CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 42-44 (1966).  Cf. 
CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES 172-73 (2d ed. 1935). 
 101. MARX, supra note 18, at 150-52. 
 102. Id. at 152-53. 
 103. Id. at 153. 
 104. See generally WALTER LICHT, INDUSTRIALIZING AMERICA 41-43 (1995); 
Winifred Barr Rothenberg, The Invention of American Capitalism: The Economy of New 
England in the Federal Period, in ENGINES OF ENTERPRISE 93-103 (Peter Temin ed., 
2000). 
 105. MARX, supra note 18, at 148. 
 106. See id. at 146, 148 (noting how “[i]t did not occur to Jefferson that the 
factory system was a necessary feature of technological process,” and that most 
American statesmen did not anticipate industrialization). 
 107. Id. at 166-68; see generally MANSEL G. BLACKFORD & K. AUSTIN KERR, 
BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 98-102 (1986) (discussing the origins of 
industrial production in America; America’s first textile mill was built in 1791 and 
did not achieve success until 1801). 
18
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reappropriated for the vocabulary of industrialization.108  
Technology had yet to be recognized as a concept.109 
Perhaps the best contemporary exposition of the concept of 
commerce is provided by Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations.110  In 
the chapter “Of Treaties of Commerce,” Smith uses the term in a 
limited sense, describing commerce as the movement of 
commodities between states.111  He confirms this description by 
relating commerce to infrastructure: roads, bridges, canals, and 
harbors.112 
But in a section discussing “the Public Works and Institutions 
which are necessary for facilitating particular Branches of 
Commerce,” Smith employs the concept of commerce more 
broadly.113  The “Institutions” that Smith discussed were chartered 
trading companies, the predecessors of the modern corporation.114  
Although the primary purpose of the trading companies was to 
import and export goods, they were also broadly vested elsewhere.  
The companies’ concerns included whaling, insurance, banking, 
water supply, glass grinding, mining, and textiles.115  The substance 
of Smith’s critique is that the charter companies—the “Institutions 
. . . necessary for facilitating particular Branches of Commerce”—
were better at handling manufacturing, or securities, than foreign 
trade.116  Thus, Smith appears to have a concept of commerce that 
 
 108. MARX, supra note 18, at 166 n. 
 109. Id. at 149. 
 110. See 1 WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 99 (1953). 
 111. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF 
NATIONS *233 (3d ed. 1784) (University of Chicago Great Books edition) 
[hereinafter SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS] (“When a nation binds itself by treaty 
either to permit the entry of certain goods from one foreign country. . . or to 
exempt the goods of one country from duties. . . or at least the merchants and 
manufacturers of the country, whose commerce is so favored, must necessarily 
derive great advantage . . . .”). 
 112. Id. at *315-16. 
 113. Id. at *319.  In support of this proposition, Crosskey also turns to the 
original index of Smith’s work, where Smith cross-references commerce with 
“Agriculture, Banks, Capital, Manufactures, Merchant, Money, Stock, Trade, etc.”  
1 CROSSKEY, supra note 110, at 100 (quoting SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 
111, at *434). 
 114. See SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 111 at *320, *323, *330; see also 
BLACKFORD & KERR, supra note 107, at 30. 
 115. SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 111 at *330-31. 
 116. See id. at *331.  Much of Smith’s critique is an indictment of the 
corruption and inefficiency of the charter companies.  They often were bailed out 
by Parliament; the only way the companies operated profitably was under auspices 
of an official monopoly.  See generally id. at *326-30. 
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expands beyond the movement of goods. 
Other leaders among the Framers appear to adopt a similar 
concept.  For example, when Hamilton advocated for a national 
bank in 1780, he described “several public manufactories” as “a 
species of commerce,” as well as speaking of a bank as engaged “in 
commerce.”117  Prior to the Framing, John Dickinson used his 
Farmer’s Letters to advocate plenary “commercial power” for 
Parliament and to seek common regulation of trade.118  In 
response, Jefferson soundly criticized Dickinson’s view, saying, 
Mr. Dickinson . . . not daring to question the authority to 
regulate commerce so best to answer [British] purposes, 
to which we had so long submitted, admitted that 
authority in its utmost extent.  He acknowledged in his 
Farmer’s Letters that they could put down our looms, 
slitting mills, and other instruments of manufacture . . . .  
He therefore admitted they they might control our 
commerce . . . .119 
Regardless of Dickinson’s own point of view, the power at stake was 
“authority to regulate commerce.”  Although Jefferson did not 
agree with Dickinson’s view, he found Dickinson’s interpretation of 
that power credible enough to merit a response.120 
 
 117. See 1 CROSSKEY, supra note 110, at 93 (citing Letter from Alexander 
Hamilton to Robert Morris (1780), in 3 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, WORKS, at 322, 334, 
339, 340 (fed. ed.) (1904)).  But cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 590 
(1995) (Thomas, J. concurring) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 23 (Hamilton) 
(finding that Hamilton viewed commerce as an independent concept from 
agriculture and manufacturing). 
 118. See 1 CROSSKEY, supra note 110 at 132 (citing 1 JOHN DICKINSON, POLITICAL 
WRITINGS 138-42 (1801)). 
 119. See 1 id. at 133 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Francois Soules 
(Sept. 13, 1786)(Library of Congress), at http://memory.loc.gov [select Series 1; 
select letters dated from July 23, 1786; select images 317 and 318]). 
 120. A comparison of other contemporary sources shows considerable 
variation in the use and definition of the concept of commerce.  For example, 
Crosskey’s authorities include a Boston newspaper where commerce “is not 
intended merely [to include] the exports and imports of the country”; a 1719 
pamphlet on trade where commerce includes “all manner of Exchange in dealing” 
including “Exchange. . . [of] Labour either for Labour or Wages”; and a Virginia 
newspaper article soliciting support for a textile factory, “not doubting but by 
proper caution and a regularity of commerce, they will be able, after a short time, 
to manufacture as low as imported.”  In addition to the Federalist Papers, Justice 
Thomas relies in part upon some contemporary newspapers, which note that 
agriculture is a “source of commerce,” and that manufacturing is a beneficiary of 
commerce; and upon Elliot’s Debates, where a delegate to the North Carolina 
convention described commerce as the “nurse” of agriculture and manufacturing.  
Compare 1 CROSSKEY, supra note 110, at 91-93, with Lopez, 514 U.S. at 590. 
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At this point, it is interesting to return to Tench Coxe, who 
joined the Washington Administration as an Assistant Secretary of 
the Treasury.121  In his Sketch of the General Trade of the United 
States, Coxe purported to take a “survey of the American 
commerce.”122  In particular, Coxe discussed shipbuilding, fishing, 
and agriculture; he also observed the difficulties American farmers 
were having in obtaining credit for their goods abroad.123  Coxe’s 
statements do not unequivocally define commerce, but they show 
how broad economic analysis had acquired and was changing the 
concept of commerce. 
In any case, the historical record is far from disclosing any 
certain definition for commerce.  Instead, it appears that even at 
the time of the Framers, there was significant disparity in both the 
understanding and application of the concept.124  Because of this 
indeterminacy, scholars struggled to provide a clear indication of 
constitutional power.125  Two noted scholars opted for a liberal 
reading of commerce.  For example, John Taylor said, 
The whole property and wealth of the country are more 
nearly connected with commerce, than roads are with war; 
and the mode of reasoning in that case will embrace 
agriculture, and invest Congress with a power of 
regulating that also, as is attempted by making it tributary 
to manufactures.126 
Justice Story’s seminal treatise, Commentaries on the 
Constitution of the United States, further expands Taylor’s 
theme.127  After noting the nation’s economic difficulties under the 
Articles, Justice Story found that under the Constitution the 
concept of commerce must be understood liberally, in its “general 
 
 121. See 1 CROSSKEY, supra note 110, at 87 (citing Tench Coxe, A Sketch of the 
General Trade of the United States, in A VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 337-44 
(1794)). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id.; see also Tench Coxe, A Sketch of the General Trade of the United States, in A 
VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 340-41 (1974). 
 124. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 125. See JOHN TAYLOR, CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUED AND CONSTITUTIONS 
VINDICATED 22 (1820) (raising the concern that “chains of inferences” would be 
used to overextend federal power). 
 126. Id. at 221.  It is interesting to compare this statement with Taylor’s 
sentiments regarding federal power. See supra note 125. 
 127. For further information on Justice Story’s influence on early 
constitutional jurisprudence, see R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 
JOSEPH STORY (1985). 
21
Moriarity: Originalism and the Commerce Clause: A Migratory Flight
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2002
08_MORIARITY 4/18/2002  5:05 PM 
1596 WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:4 
sense.”128  He then addresses the controversy surrounding the scope 
of the concept, which eerily mirrors the modern debate: some favor 
a narrow interpretation, limiting Congress to its enumerated 
powers and avoiding federal interference in state affairs; others 
favor a broad interpretation, allowing Congress to facilitate 
domestic industry and prevent the interference of foreign 
powers.129  Justice Story concludes, 
[I]f congress does not possess the power to encourage 
domestic manufactures by regulations of commerce, the 
power is annihilated for the entire nation. . . .  No man 
can doubt, that domestic agriculture and manufactures 
may be most essentially promoted and protected by 
regulations of commerce.  No man can doubt, that it is 
the most usual, and generally the most efficient means of 
producing those results.130 
At the time of the Framing, both the nation’s economy and 
the concept of commerce were in transition.  The Framers may 
have been aware of the changes industrialization were bringing, but 
they could not anticipate its revolutionary dimensions.  Yet both 
the Framers themselves, and other contemporaries, were struggling 
to create a vocabulary to describe the change.  This struggle is 
shown by the controversy that surrounded the definition of 
commerce.  Its usage and meaning was far from consistent.  But 
even at that time, some advocated a liberal construction of 
commerce, a construction that would include manufacturing and 
agriculture.  By doing so, they worked toward a concept that would 
keep apace with emerging economic changes. 
B.  Development in the Supreme Court 
The historical record has disclosed, at minimum, the 
ambiguities that surround the concept of commerce.  By 
examining the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, this amorphous 
concept is tailored by a more concrete inquiry.  By necessity, the 
Court is constrained to develop an adjudicative standard, one that 
must necessarily place limits on how commerce is understood to 
apply to real-world facts.  However, this standard is not an absolute.  
First, the Court does not necessarily provide a particularized 
 
 128. See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES §§ 1054, 1057 (1833). 
 129. See 2 id. §§ 1075, 1076. 
 130. See 2 id. § 1080. 
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definition.  Second, the Court’s determinations are limited by the 
facts before it.  And third, just as the facts before the Court increase 
in complexity over time, so must its holdings account for that 
complexity.131 
Therefore, the purpose of this survey of the Court’s case law is 
not intended to provide any particularized standard.  Instead, the 
purpose of this survey is to examine some of the boundaries placed 
on the concept of commerce, and to track the evolution of those 
boundaries over time.  In the final analysis, the question is whether 
some underlying principle can account for the changes that have 
taken place. 
The natural starting point for this analysis is the Court’s first 
major Commerce Clause case, Gibbons v. Ogden.132  In that case, the 
plaintiffs challenged a New York law that gave the defendants an 
exclusive franchise over all navigable waters in the state.133  Before 
reaching the substantive issues, Chief Justice Marshall first 
considered what principles should guide the interpretation of the 
Constitution.134  After noting that there was no textual principle 
that required strict construction,135 he rejected the principle, 
saying, 
If they contend for that narrow construction which, in 
support of some theory not to be found in the 
constitution, would deny to the government those powers 
which the words of the grant, as usually understood, 
import, and which are consistent with the general views 
and objects of the instrument; for that narrow 
construction, which would cripple the government, and 
would render it unequal to the object for which it is 
declared to be instituted, and to which the powers given, 
as fairly understood, render it competent; then we cannot 
perceive the propriety of this strict construction, nor 
adopt it as the rule by which the constitution is to be 
expounded.136 
 
 131. See generally Brannon P. Denning, Means to Amend: Theories of Constitutional 
Change, 65 TENN. L. REV. 155, 226-27 (1997). 
 132.  22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); see FRANKFURTER, supra note 92, at 13-15. 
 133. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 1-2. 
 134. See id. at 187-88. 
 135. Id. (“It has been said, that [the enumerated powers] ought to be 
construed strictly.  But why ought they to be so construed?  Is there one sentence 
in the constitution which gives countenance to this rule?”). 
 136. Id. at 188.  Cf. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 202-03 
(1819) (finding that departure from the “plain meaning” of the Constitution was 
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Chief Justice Marshall went on to define the scope of 
Commerce Clause power.  He rejected limiting it to “traffic, buying 
and selling, or the interchange of commodities.”137  Then, after 
noting the importance of navigation to trade, he found that it was 
an essential element of Congress’ Commerce Clause powers.138  But 
Chief Justice Marshall goes even further, unambiguously seeking to 
extend the breadth of the Commerce Clause.  Rather than 
restricting it to simple passage between states, he finds, “Commerce 
among the States, cannot stop at the external boundary line of 
each State, but may be introduced into the interior.”139 
Only after laying this broad foundation does Chief Justice 
Marshall move to the most ambitious part of the decision, the 
recognition of the “dormant” Commerce Clause.140  In a structural 
argument, he finds that where state power is inconsistent with the 
federal power, the federal power controls.141  Interestingly, the 
Chief Justice did not attempt to demonstrate where the precise 
conflict of powers had occurred, or how the exercise of power by 
one negated the power of the other.  Instead, without further 
analysis, he relied upon his prior, broad assessment of commerce to 
both prove the conflict and permit implementation of the 
doctrine.142 
By contrast, the limits of the Commerce Clause were more 
clearly drawn in Cooley v. Board of Wardens.143  Here, Pennsylvania 
passed a law requiring that vessels on the Delaware River obtain a 
local river pilot.144  In his opinion, Justice Curtis conceded 
 
warranted only where “the absurdity and injustice” of such interpretation was 
clearly obvious). 
 137. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 189-90.  In one of Chief Justice Marshall’s more 
oracular statements, he describes commerce as “intercourse,” without necessarily 
distinguishing the term from ordinary traffic or trade.  See id. 
 138. Id. at 193-94.  The Chief Justice also supports his argument intratextually, 
relying upon Art. I § 9 cl. 1.  The clause barred Congress, prior to 1808, from 
prohibiting the “migration or importation” of slaves.  Noting that the clause “has 
always been considered as an exception from the power to regulate commerce,” 
he found that commerce must otherwise include migration and importation.  He 
also drew what, from the modern perspective, is a fairly disturbing analogy 
between the voluntary and involuntary transportation of persons.  See id. at 206-07, 
216-17. 
 139. Id. at 194. 
 140. See generally 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 4.4 (3d ed. 1999). 
 141. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 205-06. 
 142. See id. 
 143. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). 
 144. Id. at 311-12. 
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Congress’ power to regulate navigation.145  But he held that river 
pilots did not fall within this category.146  To place this limit on the 
Commerce Clause, he discussed the purposes for which the 
Commerce Clause was intended. 
Now, the power to regulate commerce, embraces a vast 
field, containing not only many, but exceedingly various 
subjects, quite unlike in their natures; some imperatively 
demanding a single uniform rule, operating equally on 
the commerce of the United States in every port; and 
some, like the subject now in question, as imperatively 
demanding that diversity, which alone can meet the local 
necessities of navigation.147 
Put another way, Justice Curtis considered whether federal 
regulation was necessary, or whether local regulation best suited 
the issue.  Instead of applying a traditional police power analysis—
asking whether the issue was a matter of public health and safety—
he examined the practical effects of the regulation.148  After noting 
that local pilots are far better suited to the task than could possibly 
be dictated by the federal government, Justice Curtis held that the 
power to regulate local pilots was outside the Commerce Clause.149 
At this point, the boundaries of the Commerce Clause are 
responding to two competing ideas.  Chief Justice Marshall set out 
a broad, amorphous concept, providing that the Commerce Clause 
power can act both between the states and within the states.  While 
he acknowledges that the states must retain some powers,150 he also 
takes care to avoid a determinate separation of powers between the 
federal government and the states, implicitly leaving the door open 
for greater exercise of federal power.  By contrast, while adverting 
to matters that “imperatively demand” federal control, Justice 
Curtis articulates a limiting principle.  Part of his argument is an 
abstract calculation of power: he notes how unchecked federal 
power, in and of itself, both disempowers the states and 
deconstructs the federal system.151  But he also offers a pragmatic 
analysis: if a matter only has local effects, or can best be served by 
 
 145. Id. at 315. 
 146. Id. at 320. 
 147. Id. at 319. 
 148. Id. at 320. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 203-04. 
 151. Cooley, 53 U.S. at 318-19. 
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local expertise, he finds that the state should control.152 
When modern technology is introduced, it becomes more 
difficult to determine whether state or federal regulation can be 
effective.  For example, in Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union 
Telegraph Co., the Court had to decide between state and federal 
control of communications technology.153  Congress had passed a 
law that gave all telegraph companies the right to build lines upon 
all federal waters and lands, including railroad rights-of-way.154  
Florida granted Pensacola Telegraph the exclusive right to build 
telegraph lines in two Florida counties, and Western Union 
challenged the grant, relying upon the federal law.155 
In an opinion by Chief Justice Waite, the Court ruled in favor 
of the federal law, finding Congress had power under the 
Commerce Clause.156  Discussing the new technology, the Chief 
Justice did not attempt to redefine commerce, but instead 
examined the evolution of the commerce power itself. 
The powers thus granted are not confined to the 
instrumentalities of commerce. . . but they keep pace with 
the progress of the country, and adapt themselves to the 
new developments of time and circumstances.  They 
extend from the horse and its rider to the stage-coach, 
from the sailing vessel to the steamboat, from the coach 
and the steamboat to the railroad, and from the railroad 
to the telegraph, as these new agencies are successively 
brought into use to meet the demands of increasing 
population and wealth.157 
What makes Chief Justice Waite’s argument interesting is what it 
lacks.  For instance, he fails to note that the telegraph, unlike the 
other “instrumentalities,” does not involve the transportation of 
others.  The line at issue was fully within the state of Florida, and he 
does not distinguish between interstate and intrastate 
communications, nor does he attempt to explain why a local service 
requires federal control.158  Instead, the Chief Justice looks at the 
relationship between interstate commerce and the information 
 
 152. Id. at 319. 
 153. See Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U.S. (6 
Otto) 1, 3-4 (1877). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 5. 
 156. Id. at 10. 
 157. Id. at 9. 
 158. See id. at 9-10. 
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conveyed by telegraph.  He finds that the telegraph is both 
“instrumental” to interstate transactions and necessary for the 
acquisition of information.159  Thus, the underlying basis for the 
decision was an examination of the telegraph’s effect on interstate 
commerce. 
However, the Court’s reaction to new developments in 
technology was far from uniform.  United States v. E.C. Knight Co.160 
was one of the first major antitrust cases to be considered by the 
Court.161  Here, the technological development was more abstract 
but nonetheless novel, involving the centralization of production 
and the implementation of an interlocking directorate.162  In the 
case, American Sugar Refining Company swapped stock with its 
four main competitors, thus obtaining control over ninety-eight 
percent of refined sugar production.163 
Unlike Pensacola Telegraph, the Court, led by Chief Justice 
Fuller, begins by articulating some discrete limits upon the 
Commerce Clause.  First, he finds that intrastate restraints upon 
trade are properly regulated per the states’ police power.164  Then, 
in a separate argument, he relies upon a narrow definition of 
commerce, which includes purchase, sale or transport but which 
excludes manufacture.165  Chief Justice Fuller’s principal concern is 
the danger of unlimited federal power, and he is more concerned 
with the effect upon federal power than the effect of the monopoly 
itself.166 
Part of the Court’s resistance to federal power may be ascribed 
to its discomfort with the institutions involved.  To sidestep a 
determination of the sugar trust’s effect upon the national 
economy, Chief Justice Fuller observes, “It will be perceived how 
far-reaching the proposition is that the power of dealing with a 
monopoly directly may be exercised by the general government 
whenever interstate or international commerce may be ultimately 
affected.”167  Thus, when Chief Justice Fuller makes his final 
 
 159. Id. at 10. 
 160. 156 U.S. 1 (1894). 
 161. MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN 
CAPITALISM 1890-1916 124-27 (1988). 
 162. Id. at 98, 124. 
 163. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 3, 6 (1894). 
 164. Id. at 11. 
 165. Id. at 14 (quoting Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1888)). 
 166. Id. at 13-14. 
 167. Id. at 13. 
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analysis, he ignores the broader effect of the trust, noting that the 
stock transactions and the manufacturing at issue was solely 
intrastate.168 
In dissent, Justice Harlan revisits many of the previously 
identified themes.  Like in Cooley, Justice Harlan examines whether 
state power is sufficient to handle the issue.169  He observes that 
states have power to regulate intrastate monopolies, but that the 
sugar trust’s control has national scope.170  Like in Pensacola 
Telegraph, Justice Harlan examines the effects of the new 
technology—here, the monopolizing trust.  Rather than confining 
his inquiry to the site of the manufacturing, or to the site of the 
stock transactions, he looks to the effect of the trust as a whole, 
connecting the powers of the directorate to the means of 
production.171 
E.C. Knight is indicative of the boundaries that had evolved in 
Commerce Clause doctrine.  Chief Justice Fuller represents the 
static, but orthodox,172 view that required a clear separation 
between federal Commerce Clause powers and state police powers.  
To maintain this static distinction, the consideration of 
technology’s effect upon commerce had to be limited.  Justice 
Harlan provided a more evolutive approach.  He challenged the 
status quo, reevaluating the commerce power in light of societal 
change.  But he also incorporated some of the core principles from 
early Commerce Clause jurisprudence: Chief Justice Marshall’s 
concept of a power, not limited to trade in commodities, that could 
reach within the states; and Justice Curtis’ comparison of federal 
and state governments’ competence to regulate their affairs. 
Notwithstanding the distance between Chief Justice Fuller and 
Justice Harlan, both static and evolutive principles continued to 
operate upon Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  In the Shreveport 
Rate Cases, the Supreme Court considered the Interstate Commerce 
Commission’s (ICC) power to control intrastate rail rates.173  The 
plaintiffs were two Texas-based railroad companies that charged 
 
 168. Id. at 17. 
 169. Id. at 42-43; see supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text. 
 170. Id. at 37-38, 42-43. 
 171. Id. at 34-35. 
 172. See 2 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 
1240-41, 1274, 1277 (8th ed. 1927); see also 1 ROTUNDA, supra note 140, § 4.6. 
 173. See Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States (Shreveport Rate 
Cases), 234 U.S. 342, 345 (1914). 
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higher rates of service to Shreveport than for comparable service to 
Texas cities.174  The difference in rates was “substantial” enough to 
place Shreveport at a competitive disadvantage to Texas ports.175  As 
a result, the ICC ordered that the Texas carriers’ rates to 
Shreveport be lowered to match rates in Texas.176 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Hughes, held 
that the Commerce Clause offered a sufficient basis for 
congressional action.177  He found that the Commerce Clause 
embraced 
all matters having such a close and substantial relation to 
interstate traffic that the control is essential or 
appropriate to the security of that traffic, to the efficiency 
of interstate service, and to the maintenance of conditions 
under which interstate commerce may be conducted 
upon fair terms and without molestation or hindrance.  As 
it is competent for Congress to legislate to these ends, 
unquestionably it may seek their attainment by requiring 
that the agencies of interstate commerce shall not be used 
in such a manner as to cripple, retard or destroy it.178 
In light of the purposes Justice Hughes attributes to the Commerce 
Clause, it is interesting to compare the Shreveport Rate Cases with 
E.C. Knight.  Both cases involved monopolies; the only difference 
was that the Rate Cases was strictly a geographic monopoly.  Perhaps 
the only material difference between the two cases was that the Rate 
Cases involved railroads, a long-recognized instrumentality of 
commerce,179 whereas E.C. Knight involved a corporate abstraction, 
the monopoly trust.180  In addition, the Rate Cases addressed a local 
phenomenon, what Justice Hughes called the “rivalries of local 
governments.”181  Thus, although the issue and effect at stake were 
far less significant than that in E.C. Knight, Justice Hughes 
employed sweeping language to describe Congress’ powers under 
the Commerce Clause.  Indeed, a determination of the effects 
upon interstate commerce—in Justice Hughes’ own words, to 
 
 174. See id. at 345-46. 
 175. Id. at 346. 
 176. Id. at 345. 
 177. Id. at 359. 
 178. Id. at 351. 
 179. E.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 163 U.S. 142, 153 (1895); see also 1 
ROTUNDA, supra note 140, § 4.5. 
 180. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 1. 
 181. Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. at 350. 
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“cripple, retard or destroy”182—indicates movement back toward 
the evolutive considerations Justice Harlan suggested in his prior 
dissent.183 
Over twenty years later, Justice Hughes revisited those 
considerations in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.184  The case 
challenged Congress’ power to impose sanctions against employers 
for discriminatory anti-union practices.185  Justice Hughes begins his 
analysis with an examination of the steel industry, noting its scope 
and effect within the national economy.186  Then, he states the 
doctrinal theme. 
The congressional authority to protect interstate 
commerce from burdens and obstructions which can be 
deemed to be an essential part of the “flow” of interstate 
or foreign commerce.  Burdens and obstructions may be 
due to injurious action springing from other sources.  The 
fundamental principle is that the power to regulate 
commerce is the power to enact ‘all appropriate 
legislation’ for its ‘protection or advancement’ . . . .  
Although activities may be intrastate in character when 
separately considered, if they have such a close and 
substantial relation to interstate commerce that their 
control is essential or appropriate to protect that 
commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress 
cannot be denied the power to exercise that control.187 
Although Justice Hughes’ formulation was a revolutionary turn 
in Commerce Clause jurisprudence,188 it was not a unilateral 
departure from established doctrine.  Instead, it was a juncture 
between two competing interpretive schemes, both of which had 
existed from the inception of the Commerce Clause.  Because the 
evolutive principle helped define the boundaries of the Commerce 
Clause, it was a meaningful—and available—analytical tool.  It was 
 
 182. Id. at 351. 
 183. See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.  It must be reiterated that 
Justice Hughes’ statement only referred to the “agencies” of commerce.  
“Agencies” clearly included transportation, such as railroads, but the term would 
not necessarily have embraced manufacturing or production.  Cf. Furst v. 
Brewster, 282 U.S. 493, 497-98 (1931) (examining the application of the 
Commerce Clause to interstate shipping). 
 184. 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (5-4 decision). 
 185. Id. at 22. 
 186. Id. at 27. 
 187. Id. at 36-37 (citations omitted). 
 188. See generally ROTUNDA, supra note 140, §§ 4.7, 4.9. 
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not always at the center of jurisprudence doctrinally.189  
Nevertheless, it was better suited to address the economic and 
technological issues before the Court, and thus found open 
expression in Jones & Laughlin. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
By necessity, the development of the Commerce Clause was 
driven by economic change.  Even at the time of the Framing, the 
concept of commerce was in flux.  No discrete limitations were 
placed upon the concept. 
When those limitations developed, two principles emerged.  
Chief Justice Marshall espoused a flexible, federal power; Justice 
Curtis sought to preserve the states’ powers.  The scope of state 
power was not only defined in terms of police power, but also in 
terms of federal and state competence to regulate economic issues.  
Modern economic institutions tested these limits by exerting 
influence that exceeded state control.  To respond to these 
changes, practical, evolutive principles were incorporated into 
Commerce Clause doctrine. 
These principles contrast with originalism.  By setting a 
historical foundation for constitutional interpretation, it aspires for 
a fair and consistent adjudicative standard—a standard that does 
not evolve over time, but instead anchors itself to an age of 
 
 189. Without further elucidation, this proposition risks a glib dismissal of 
much of pre-New Deal Commerce Clause jurisprudence.  There are two deeper 
philosophical issues at play here, and both of them fall beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
  First, and most significantly, is the problem of how precedent controls 
constitutional law.  Here, the question is what principles will allow the reevaluation 
or reversal of constitutional doctrine.  See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare 
Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
570 (2001); Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 23 (1994). 
  A related, but separate, problem is the difficulty of deriving a broad principle 
from a limited survey of caselaw.  To borrow an analogy from science, the analysis 
relies upon a limited number of experimental results—here, the selected cases—
to describe a governing principle.  A more intensive survey of cases, or more 
“experimental results,” would help flesh out the principle.  On the other hand, 
microscopic examination can obscure important, larger principles.  Although this 
paper attempts to strike a balance between the two extremes, further 
consideration of caselaw is an appropriate test of the thesis.  Certainly, some cases 
interrupt the trends that this paper identifies.  See, e.g., South Carolina v. United 
States, 199 U.S. 437, 463 (1905) (Brewer, J.) (holding that federal taxation of state-
operated liquor sales was permissible under the Commerce Clause). 
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certainties.  But as demonstrated by the sweep of case law from 
Gibbons to Jones & Laughlin, every time a doctrine confronts a new 
idea—regardless of whether that doctrine is static or evolutive—it is 
reformed.  In the course of the survey, it is particularly interesting 
to note how rarely the intent of the Framers is relied upon, much 
less adverted to. 
Nevertheless, the step away from certainty, from an absolute 
principle, is precipitous.  Certainly, some commentators correctly 
point out that complete reliance upon a dynamic approach, 
without some underlying, controlling principle, is dangerous.190  
But law is not produced in an academic vacuum.  For law to be 
legitimate, it requires the legal community to accept its principles, 
even though it may be far from agreement on its application.191  
Thus, precedent, reasoning, tradition, and consistency still 
maintain valued and necessary roles in the development of law.192 
Returning to the beginning of the paper, Llewellyn noted the 
“inconvenience” of power that cannot be strictly constrained.193  
However, he goes on to say, “Yet the greater inconvenience lies in 
obfuscation of those vibrant tails which have become the things 
that count in life.”194  It is the “vibrant tail,” the modern experience, 
that requires constitutional law to continue responding to, and 
serving, a changing society. 
 
 
 190. See Tribe, supra note 22, at 1298 n. 247 (finding that a dynamic evaluation 
of constitutional norms “seems more than a bit schizophrenic”). 
 191. See Donald H.J. Hermann, Legal Reasoning as Argumentation, 12 N. KY. L. 
REV. 467, 469 (1985) (“[L]egal reasoning . . . is dependent upon the legal 
conclusion and the reasons given in support of it being accepted by the audience 
or constituency to which such argumentation is directed.”). 
 192. See Stanley Mosk, The Common Law and the Judicial Decision-Making Process, 
11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 35, 40-41 (1988). 
 193. See supra text accompanying note 1. 
 194. Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 15-16.  For more information about Karl 
Llewellyn’s impact on the law, see N.E.H. Hull, The Romantic Realist: Art, Literature, 
and the Enduring Legacy of Karl Llewellyn’s “Jurisprudence,” 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 115 
(1996). 
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